Lost in translation

Automation companies increasingly extol the virtues of integration solutions – linking shop floor to the top floor (and out beyond) through such concepts as integrated architecture or totally integrated automation. But getting systems to talk to each other is often just as much a management or cultural issue as a technical one.

The consequences of failing to integrate holistically can be significant. Or rather, spectacularly disastrous in the case of the Airbus 380. With extensive press coverage, the troubles surrounding the launch of this new generation aircraft built by a consortium of French, German, British and Spanish companies under the auspices of the European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co (EADS) are by now familiar: delivery delays stretching into years, order cancellations, billions of dollars in losses, high profile firings and resignations. But not so well known is exactly what went wrong, and the key part played by technology.

So here’s what happened. Work for the mammoth project is spread across 16 sites, four countries, and 41,000 people; many subsystems being designed and built in one location for later integration with subsystems developed another location. (There is also a certain amount of national pride at stake, for example, the Germans refusing to allow the whole of the aircraft to be built in the France, the headquarters of Airbus.)

German engineers were given responsibility for the 100,000 electrical wires used to power the main cabin, while French engineers were tasked with creating the fuselage to locate the wiring bundles. Unfortunately, although both sets of engineers were using the same 3D CAD software (Catia) from the same supplier (Dassault) for their design work, crucially, the French were using an upgraded V5 and the Germans the earlier V4.

Incompatibility at the file level meant inaccurate data exchange between the two systems, including dimensional errors, which resulted in the wires not fitting into the fuselage and the beginning of extensive rework and lengthy production delays.

Critics point not so much to the file incompatibility – not uncommon when software is improved – but management failure in allowing development work to take place on two different platforms, probably in an effort to save money.

Interestingly, Airbus’ only competitor and fierce rival, Boeing, is also using Dassault’s Catia software in the development of the new 787 Dreamliner aircraft. But the company mandated early in the project that all suppliers would use the same version – Catia V5, even though costs for getting everyone on the same platform amounted to over $100 million. But as the Dreamliner takes to the skies, winning over orders from disgruntled Airbus customers, it seems to be money well spent.

BOB GILL

Group Editor